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DO THE DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS IN THE EU
UNDERMINE MEMBER STATES’ NATIONAL INTEREST?:
A CASE STUDY OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME
ABSTRACT
Following the shocking results of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 and
the Greek referendum rejecting austerity measures in 2015, many believe that
the European Union (EU) is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. The most vocal
Eurosceptics claim that the EU threatens individual Member State sovereignty,
with the chief concern being that the EU’s decision-making mechanisms are
leaving certain Member States overruled in major decisions. While it is too
early to tell whether this is the first of many similarly named “exits,” it is clear
that what were previously rumbles of discontent have now swelled to an
outcry. This Comment will therefore explore the decision-making mechanisms
employed at the supranational level of the EU, with a particular focus on the
EU’s sanctions regime, revealing the heart of the struggle between efficiency
in decision-making and preservation of national sovereignty. Legally, the
founding treaties of the EU—the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) set rules for the
decision-making mechanisms in an effort to balance these two aims. But how
effective are these mechanisms? This Comment will ultimately conclude that
the safeguards in place in the founding treaties are flawed, but there are
solutions available to improve the decision-making process in the sanctions
regime. Though the treaties aim to preserve individual Member State
autonomy, the criticisms directed toward the system may indicate that the
execution in practice does not preserve that autonomy as much as the drafters
intended.
INTRODUCTION
Ahead of the famous “Brexit” referendum, Boris Johnson—now the UK
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs—1wrote an opinion

1 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/
government/ministers/foreign-secretary (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
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imploring the British people to vote to leave the European Union (EU).2 In this
opinion, he cited, among other reasons, “a hurried expansion in the areas for
Qualified Majority Voting” which left Britain overruled more and more often.3
Following the June 23, 2016 referendum where British citizens voted to leave
the EU, Vox Magazine listed the seven most important arguments in favor of
Britain leaving the EU.4 The two arguments that topped this list were: 1) “[t]he
EU threatens British sovereignty” and 2) “[t]he EU is strangling the UK in
burdensome regulations.”5 This is not the first time that a Member State
politician has expressed concern about the voting methods employed in EU
institutions.6 While it is too early to tell whether this is the first of many
similarly named “exits,”7 it is clear that what were previously rumbles of
discontent have now swelled to an outcry. Is this outcry truly indicative of a
clandestine “legal colonisation,” as Mr. Johnson claims?8
This Euroscepticism was not confined to UK borders—Nigel Farage, UK
Independence Party Leader and vocal Eurosceptic,9 implored Greece to leave
the EU and “take back control of your country.”10 Farage made these
statements ahead of Greece’s controversial referendum in July 2015.11 The
referendum asked the Greek people to choose to either reject or accept the
latest round of austerity measures in response to its economic crisis.12 In the
2 Boris Johnson, Boris Johnson Exclusive: There Is Only One Way to Get Change We Want – Vote to
Leave the EU, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 16, 2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/03/16/borisjohnson-exclusive-there-is-only-one-way-to-get-the-change/.
3 Id.
4 Timothy B. Lee, Brexit: The 7 Most Important Arguments for Britain to Leave the EU, VOX (June 25,
2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/22/11992106/brexit-arguments.
5 Id.
6 Associated Press, The Latest: Hollande Complains of Slow EU Decision-Making, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
6, 2016, 1:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-the-latest-hollande-complains-of-slow-eu-decisionmaking-2016-4. For a discussion of voters’ concerns about the voting methods used in the EU, see Peter Roff,
Brexit Was About Britain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 30, 2016, 11:25 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/articles/2016-06-30/poll-shows-brexit-vote-was-about-british-sovereignty-not-anti-immigration.
7 See Kate Lyons & Gordon Darroch, Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who Will Be Next to Leave the EU,
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2016, 3:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexitwho-will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu.
8 See Johnson, supra note 2.
9 See Julia Hartley-Brewer, Britain’s Eurosceptics Need Nigel Farage, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2015, 1:08
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/11836633/Britains-Eurosceptics-need-Nigel-Farage.html.
10 UKIP MEPs, Your Moment Has Come, Mr. Tsipras, Take Back Control of Your Country – UKIP
Leader Nigel Farage, YOUTUBE (July 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94UcyJnRcGU.
11 Ian Traynor, Greek Crisis: European Leaders Scramble for Response to Referendum No Vote,
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2015, 1:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/06/greek-crisis-europeanleaders-scramble-for-response-to-referendum-no-vote.
12 Id.

PAPADOPOLOUS GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

CASE STUDY OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME

5/16/2017 12:24 PM

555

weeks and months leading up to the referendum, those who urged the Greek
populace to vote to reject the new austerity measures—and by extension leave
the Eurozone—raised similar grievances of a lack of representation.13 When
the Greeks voted to reject the austerity measures, it exposed what a writer for
the Independent called a gaping hole in the EU—“it’s lack of genuine
legitimacy.”14 Though Greece ultimately remained in the European Union, this
“no” vote sent a clear message from the Greek people to the European elite—
“democracy cannot be blackmailed.”15
In the eyes of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, however, this vote was
less a vote to leave the EU and more an endorsement from the Greek people to
their leaders to strengthen their negotiating position in the EU institutions. In
April 2016, Tsipras told Russian lawmakers that Greece “had played an active
role in preventing an expansion of European Union sanctions against Russia
earlier this year.”16 The European Council, a supranational EU entity
composed of the heads of state of each Member State,17 is the supranational
entity charged with deciding whether to impose or renew sanctions on a third
country. The European Council must decide by unanimous vote,18 which
means Greece had a right to exercise a veto in the vote to renew the EU’s
sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea.19 Pundits and politicians
13 Ian Traynor & Helena Smith, Syriza’s Historic Win Puts Greece on Collision Course with Europe,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2015, 3:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/syriza-historic-wingreece-european-union-austerity.
14 Rupert Cornwell, Greece Crisis: Referendum Exposes a Gaping Hole at the Heart of the European
Union – Its Lack of Genuine Legitimacy, INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/
comment/greece-crisis-referendum-exposes-a-gaping-hole-at-the-heart-of-the-european-union-its-lack-of10366240.html.
15 Ian Traynor, John Hooper & Helena Smith, Greek Referendum No Vote Signals Huge Challenge to
Eurozone Leaders, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2016); Ian Traynor, Three Days That Saved the Euro, GUARDIAN (Oct.
22, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/three-days-to-save-the-euro-greece. The
Greek energy minister at the time stated “if the Greek people say no, it is going to be impossible for those who
wield power not to take note unless democracy no longer exists.” Id. See also Lefteris Papadimas & Renee
Maltezou, Greeks Defy Europe with Overwhelming Referendum ‘No’, REUTERS (July 5, 2015, 7:13 P.M.),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-idUSKBN0P40EO20150705.
16 Laura Mills, Tsipras Tells Russia Greece Helped Prevent Broader EU Sanctions, WALL STREET J.
(Apr. 9, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tsipras-tells-russia-greece-helped-prevent-broader-eusanctions-1428577645.
17 PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 47 (Oxford University
Press 5th ed. 2011). The European Council and its functions are governed by Article 15 of the Treaty on the
European Union (TEU). Id.
18 Adoption and Review Procedure for EU Sanctions, EUR. COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/policies/sanctions/adoption-review-procedure/ (last updated May 11, 2016).
19 Clara Portela, Member States Resistance to EU Foreign Policy Sanctions, 20 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV.
39, 41 (2015).
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alike speculated about the likelihood that Greece, a small Member State, would
attempt to exercise its power and trade favors with Moscow: a veto of further
EU sanctions on Russia in exchange for financial assistance from Russia.20
This power to veto a decision would seem to suggest that individual Member
States are represented in at least one area: decisions made under the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
CFSP decisions are among the most controversial.21 The decision to impose
sanctions on Russia most closely aligned with British interests. Now that
Britain has decided to leave the EU, experts predict that the EU sanctions
policy will be substantially weakened.22 The UK has fought for EU sanctions
on Russia since the Russian military annexed Crimea.23 Many commentators
believe that the United Kingdom represented the United States’ foothold in the
EU and is the driving force behind the EU’s persistent renewal of sanctions on
Russia.24 Greece stands in opposition to the UK-backed sanctions on Russia,
which hurt an already crippled Greek economy. This Comment will explore
the competing concepts of unanimous decision-making and representativeness
in the European Council. It will use the sanctions regime as the lens for this
analysis. Although there is a strong argument that Member States interests are
not adequately represented in the European Council, this Comment argues that
the situation is not as dire as is suggested by Eurosceptics. The United
Kingdom is at one side of the ideological spectrum with regard to Russian
sanctions, with Greece at the other. Both countries, however, claim that their
interests are underrepresented in EU policy decisions. This Comment will
reveal that both Member States have more clout than they think they do, and
the process, though flawed, is not fated to fail.
This Comment will explore decision-making at the supranational level of
the EU, revealing the heart of the struggle between efficiency and national
20 Andrew Higgins, EU Agrees to Extend Economic Sanctions Against Russia, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/world/europe/eu-agrees-to-extend-economic-sanctions-againstrussia.html?_r=0. See Joshua Keating, Could China or Russia Bail Out Greece if Europe Won’t?, SLATE
(July 2, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/07/02/could_china_or_russia_bail_out_greece_if_
europe_won_t.html.
21 See Common Foreign and Security Policy, POLITICS.CO.UK, http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/
common-foreign-and-security-policy (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
22 Erica Moret, What Would Brexit Mean for EU Sanctions Policy?, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Mar.
23, 2016), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_would_brexit_mean_for_eu_sanctions_policy6046.
23 Dan De Luce & Paul McLeary, Brexit Is Good News for Russia but a Headache for NATO, FOREIGN
POL’Y (June 26, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/brexit-is-good-news-for-russia-but-a-headachefor-nato/.
24 Id.
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sovereignty. Legally, the founding treaties of the EU—the Treaty on the
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)25—lay out the decision-making mechanisms for EU
institutions, in an effort to balance the two aims mentioned above.26
This analysis is inspired by a search for answers to the following questions:
How can the EU efficiently legislate but still account for the needs of twentyeight27 different Member States? How does individual Member State resistance
change when it comes time to vote?28 What happens when an EU sanctioning
policy runs counter to the national interests of an individual Member State?
Can this type of decision-making truly reflect the will of each of the Member
States of the Union? How efficient has this decision-making mechanism been
at preserving the national interests of each Member State? Do the voting
methods employed infringe on national sovereignty of individual Member
States?
This Comment will proceed as follows. Part I of this Comment will provide
a basic introduction to the EU sanctions regime. This Part will also analyze
how the sanctions regime developed within both the Common Commercial
Policy (CCP) and the CFSP, highlighting the legal and political inconsistencies
that arose in an effort to promote efficiency and coherence. Part II of this
Comment will explore the decision-making mechanisms used in the European
Council and the Council of the European Union when the EU sets its CFSP.29
25 This Comment will refer to provisions found in the Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective on
December 1, 2009. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 26. The Treaty of Lisbon contains two constituent
parts: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Id. at 25. Although “[t]here was. . .a conscious decision to excise the ‘C’ word, constitution” from the Treaty
of Lisbon when it was being drafted, the Treaty of Lisbon is, for all intents and purposes, the “constitution” of
the European Union. Id. The TEU and TFEU are therefore the founding treaties of the European Union and
have equal value in the hierarchy of sources of EU law. Id.
26 EU Treaties, EUROPA.EU, https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
27 EU Member Countries, EUROPA.EU, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/membercountries_en (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). This Comment will proceed with pre-Brexit numbers of EU
membership, as the logistics of what Brexit will mean for the EU are yet to be determined. See Bryony Jones,
Brexit Challenge: UK Supreme Court Hears Appeal on Article 50, CNN (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/05/europe/brexit-article-50-court-challenge/.
28 Seven EU Countries Oppose New Anti-Russian Sanctions at Summit, SPUTNIK INT’L (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150318/1019648159.html.
29 This Comment will refer to both the European Council and the Council, which are two distinct EU
institutions. The European Council refers to the heads of government of each EU Member State who convene
at quarterly summits to set policy. Council of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/council-eu/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2017). The Council refers to the
institution consisting of the ministers of each EU Member State, depending on the policy area to be discussed.
Id.
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It will critically analyze the balance of power within the European Council,
exploring whether, and to what extent, the national interests of individual
Member States are impinged upon when the European Council imposes
sanctions on trading partners vital to particular Member States. It will then
explore how the decision-making procedures for the sanctions regime arose out
of the CCP and the CFSP. It will critically analyze the two-step decisionmaking procedure, which employs both unanimous and qualified majority
voting.
Part III of this Comment will turn to the degree of power left to Member
States to implement sanctions. This Part will consider whether decisionmaking in the sanctions regime is becoming increasingly centralized, and it
will assess how much the EU has compromised national autonomy over
foreign policy in favor of efficiency. This Part of the Comment finds that,
legally, the procedural safeguards enumerated in the Constitutional Treaties
can protect Member State sovereignty in foreign policy decision-making. In
practice, however, the ability of Member States to take independent action in
the sanctions regime has been limited. The case law of the Court of Justice of
the EU (ECJ) in this area has considered whether Member States can
affirmatively adopt restrictive measures that run counter to European
Community regulations.30 However, the ECJ has not yet considered a case
where a Member State has abstained from voting and is therefore not subject to
the regulation. This Comment will consider the hypothetical scenario of a
Member State abstention from the vote on sanctions and whether the
procedural safeguards to national sovereignty do allow Member States to retain
autonomy in foreign and security policy. This Comment will ultimately
30 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v. HM Treasury and Bank of England, 1997 E.C.R.
I-81. This Comment will refer both to the European Community and the European Union. The group of
European states we now refer to as the European Union first identified itself as a series of Communities, or the
European Community. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (Routledge Publishing 3d ed. 2013).
The Treaty of Maastricht (now referred to as the TEU) renamed the European Economic Community to the
European Community and also set out the European Union for the first time in 1993. Id. at 18. The Treaty of
Lisbon then integrated the European Community into the European Union in 2009. Fact Sheets on the
European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
It is also important to note here that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is composed of
three courts: the Court of Justice (informally referred to as the ECJ), the General Court, and the Civil Service
Tribunal. Competences of the Court of Justice of the European Union, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.3.10.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). The
ECJ has jurisdiction to hear proceedings brought against EU Member States for allegedly failing to fulfill their
obligations and proceedings against EU institutions. This Comment will refer to the case law of the ECJ—that
is, the one constituent part of the greater CJEU.
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conclude that these safeguards are flawed, but there are solutions available to
improve the decision-making process in the sanctions regime. The text of the
constitutional treaties aims to preserve individual Member State autonomy;
however, the criticisms directed toward the system may indicate that the
execution in practice does not preserve that autonomy as much as the drafters
intended, but the system reflects an adequate compromise.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EU SANCTIONS REGIME
The European Union as an entity “defies classical definitions”31 because it
is not merely an intergovernmental organization like NATO or the United
Nations, and yet the institutions that make up the EU have not risen to the
requisite level of unification to create a federal “state.”32 In one of its most
famous decisions concerning the supremacy of EU law, the Court of Justice
declared: “the European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields . . . .”33 The European Union is
“the only non-state actor that participates in certain international functional
regimes on equal footing with states.”34 The question of how to define the
European Union has been discussed by myriad experts,35 and while it is
certainly an intriguing question, this Comment will not attempt to provide an
answer to it. Instead, it will analyze the interplay between two historically
supranational and intergovernmental realms of EU policy-making in the
sanctions regime.
This Comment will therefore operate under the notion that the EU is a
system containing both intergovernmental and supranational characteristics.36
31 René Smits, The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Overview of Legal
Developments, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1135, 1137 (2015).
32 E.g., Christina Eckes, How the European Parliament’s Participation in International Relations Affects
the Deep Tissue of the EU’s Power Structures, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 904, 904 (2014); KACZOROWSKA, supra
note 30, at 26.
33 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
34 Eckes, supra note 32, at 904.
35 See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel, Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental? The Governmental Structure
of the European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 77, 77 (2013) [hereinafter Goebel,
Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental?]; Stephen C. Sieberson, Inching Toward EU Supranationalism?
Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 919, 923–30 (2010);
Aurel Sari, The Conclusion of International Agreements by the European Union in the Context of ESDP, 57
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 53 (2008).
36 Sieberson, supra note 35, at 930.
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Some policy areas are seen as more intergovernmental, requiring unanimity of
all Member States in voting, while other policy areas are almost completely
supranational, where EU institutions hold the primary right of initiative.37 To
be sure, “[t]he balance between intergovernmental and supranational elements
determines the influence of EU Member States within the system, and it does
impact their national sovereignty.”38 The relevant treaty provisions
theoretically attempt to limit this impact on Member State sovereignty, but an
analysis of current events reveals a growing fear that these legal provisions do
not protect Member State national interests in practice.
This Comment will analyze the voting methods used by EU institutions to
make decisions under the CFSP. Having established the voting methods, this
Comment will then explore whether EU decision-making is becoming more
supranational; it will do so by looking primarily through the lens of the
sanctions regime, an area that combines the historically intergovernmental area
of the CFSP and the supranational area of the CCP. As the EU finds itself in
the thick of both an economic crisis and a post-Brexit legitimacy crisis, EU
trade and foreign policy decisions will be heavily scrutinized for the impact
they have on Member States’ economies.
II. EU SANCTIONS: AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION-MAKING
The sanctions regime of the EU provides an interesting legal case study
because it reflects a tension between three competing policies: 1) the CCP,
where the EU institutions have exclusive competence, 2) the CFSP, where the
heads of Member States exercise more power, and 3) the Member States’
individual foreign policy.39 Decision-making and voting procedures used by
EU institutions depend on how much competence has been granted to the
institution.40 To effectively understand the decision-making and voting
procedures used in the sanctions regime, one must understand both the
background of CFSP and CCP and the competences associated with those
policies.

37 See Goebel, Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental?, supra note 35, for a discussion of the
institutional balance of power in the European Union.
38 Sieberson, supra note 35, at 931.
39 PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 502 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2011).
40 See id. at 506–09.
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This Part will provide a background on the development of the sanctions
regime. It will then provide an analysis of the role of the sanctions regime in
the CFSP, and lay out how the decision-making mechanisms apply to the
sanctions regime. This Part will then analyze the unique position of the
sanctions regime between CFSP and CCP, and how that position showcases
the inherent struggle between the two policies.41 This analysis will demonstrate
the progression of the EU from a system protecting Member State sovereignty
toward one where Member States have relinquished some decision-making
power to allow for a more coherent and efficient decision-making process.
Lastly, this Part will analyze the EU treaty law governing sanctions,
particularly the decision-making mechanisms employed by the European
Council.
A. EU Sanctions: A Background
The sanctions regime developed in the space where CCP and CFSP
overlap, emerging as a hybrid of trade and foreign policy.42 Sanctions interrupt
the import and export of goods to force a state to modify its behavior, which
means that any trade policy interests become secondary to a more important
foreign policy goal.43 Thus, economic sanctions “are specific trade policy
instruments which are exclusively employed for foreign policy objectives.”44
The sanctions policy therefore vacillates between the treaty provisions
governing CFSP and those of the CCP. The history behind these two policies
provides a foundation for understanding how the integration project of the
European Union has reached even those policy areas that previously fell
exclusively within the competence of individual Member States.45

41 Some scholars argue that the sanctions regime should be classified as a tool used in crisis management
under CSDP. See generally Julia Schmidt, The High Representative, the President, and the Commission—
Competing Players in the EU’s External Relations: The Case of Crisis Management, in EU EXTERNAL
RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 161, 161 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2012).
42 EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 501. Maja Brkan, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field
of Common Foreign and Security Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future, in EU
EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 97, 105 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2012).
43 EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 501.
44 Id. at 502.
45 See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 15–16, for a discussion of the decline of “variable
geometry” (i.e., differentiation and flexibility) in favor of integration and cohesion in the European Union. The
authors point out that:

While the disadvantages of variable geometry may be a perceived lack of unity and increasing
fragmentation . . . the advantages of providing a means for accommodating difference and
reaching consensus in the face of strong divergence, for permitting progress in crucial areas such
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This Comment will deal primarily with economic sanctions against third
countries.46 The European Council Guidelines on Implementation and
Evaluation of Restrictive Measures promote the Union-wide practice of
imposing targeted sanctions, otherwise known as “smart” sanctions, which
target specific individuals who are “responsible for the policies or actions that
have prompted the EU decision to impose restrictive measures.”47 The
European Council will impose sanctions if they are necessary “to bring about a
change in policy or conduct by the targeted country, part of a country, or its
government, or entities or individuals with a view to promoting the objectives
of the CFSP.”48 It further stipulated that “[s]anctions should be used as part of
an integrated and comprehensive policy approach involving political dialogue,
complementary efforts and other instruments.”49
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked a watershed moment
in the development of the EU sanctions regime.50 Not only did the Maastricht
Treaty set out the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the first time,51 it
also tipped the balance of power between Member States and the EU within

as EMU or foreign policy which might otherwise be deadlocked, are evidently considered
sufficient to outweigh the former.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
46 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 215, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Other types of sanctions include those that the EU as a
supranational body imposes on a Member State for not complying with an EU directive or regulation, also
referred to as a penalty. Id. art. 260. The EU can also impose sanctions on individuals by using smart/targeted
sanctions. EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 502. Therefore, the phrase “sanctions on third countries” refers to
economic sanctions on a non-EU Member State. Id. at 503.
47 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures
(Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 17464/09, PESC 1746 FIN 576
(Dec. 3, 2003), amended by Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of
Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 11205/12
PESC 716 FIN 425 (June 15, 2012) 8 [hereinafter 2012 Council Guidelines on Restrictive Measures].
48 Adopting EU Restrictive Measures – Sanctions, EUR. COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
policies/sanctions/ (last updated Aug. 11, 2016). For the purposes of this Comment, the term “sanctions” will
be synonymous with the term “restrictive measures,” which is the term used by official EU documents. Id. The
definition of restrictive measures, however, “is almost identical to the definition used by individual member
states and other sanctioning organisations like the United Nations.” Joakim Kreutz, Hard Measures by a Soft
Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981-2001, 4–5 (Bonn Int’l Ctr. for Conversion, Working
Paper No. 45, 2011), https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/hard-measures-by-a-softpower-sanctions-policy-of-the-european-union-211/.
49 2012 Council Guidelines on Restrictive Measures, supra note 47, at 44.
50 Court E. Golumbic & Robert S. Ruff III, Symposium Article: Who Do I Call for an EU Sanctions
Exemption?; Why the EU Economic Sanctions Regime Should Centralize Licensing, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1007,
1017 (2013).
51 Kreutz, supra note 48, at 11.

PAPADOPOLOUS GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

CASE STUDY OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME

5/16/2017 12:24 PM

563

the sanctions regime.52 Before the Treaty, EU institutions had a passive role—
they were responsible for implementing UN sanctions—while the Member
States themselves could impose their own sanctions in any manner they saw
fit.53 The Maastricht Treaty severely limited the Member States’ ability to
impose individual sanctions, stating that the Member States “shall refrain from
any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”54
The Maastricht Treaty was the result of an EU integration project which
aimed to centralize decision-making mechanisms in foreign policy to combat
inconsistencies. The 1970s and 1980s saw much inconsistency and disparity
from Member States in the area of CFSP, as a series of European Community
agreements promoted joint action by the Member States in foreign policy, but
retained individual Member State autonomy over security policy.55 Due to a
lack of clarity, Member States remained divided and decision-making
stagnated when the time came to impose sanctions.56 The signing of the
Maastricht Treaty therefore marked the first in a series of steps away from the
decentralized CFSP regime in order to achieve efficient, coherent results. The
Treaty of Lisbon also broadened the scope of EU competence under the CFSP,
and the discussion of the decision-making procedures in Part III below expands
on these changes.
B. The Rise of the Sanctions Regime in the Overlap Between CCP and CFSP
The CCP governs EU trade policy with non-EU countries and the World
Trade Organization.57 The CCP dominates EU policy because it predates the
CFSP58 and is part of the origin story of the EU, which means that it lies within
the “exclusive competence” of the EU.59 “Exclusive competence” confers on
supranational EU institutions the power to adopt legal acts that are
automatically binding on Member States and become the supreme law
52

Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1017–18.
Id.
54 Treaty on European Union art. J.1 § 4, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) [hereinafter Treaty of
Maastricht].
55 Kreutz, supra note 48, at 9. The first (failed) step toward foreign policy integration came in 1970 with
the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1015.
56 See Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1015. This period of stagnation has been referred to as the
time of “Eurosclerosis.” KACZOROWSKA, supra note 30, at 13.
57 Sieberson, supra note 35, at 983.
58 Note that the CCP has its origins in the EEC Treaty while the CFSP was first defined in the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993. Sieberson, supra note 35, at 947.
59 EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 35.
53
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throughout the European Union, invalidating pre-existing national laws.60 The
CCP is a supranational policy, decided by a combination of qualified majority
voting and unilateral initiatives taken by the Commission. Any decision to
restrict or hinder trade must be agreed upon by a unanimous vote of the
Council.61
The decision to impose economic sanctions on a third country implicates
both trade policy and foreign policy considerations.62 Trade policy falls under
the umbrella of the CCP while foreign policy is referred to as the CFSP. Each
policy requires different levels of decision-making. Historically, the CCP fell
exclusively within EU competence, while the CFSP honored an individual
Member State’s autonomy over foreign policy.63 Any broad decision made
under the CFSP requires unanimous votes within the European Council;64 in
the CCP, however, the EU retains exclusive competence and EU institutions
set the policy without Member State input.65 The confluence of these two
policies in the sanctions regime “exemplif[ies] the difficulties associated with
achieving consistency in the EU’s external relations” and further analysis “may
reveal the extent to which fears of encroachment upon the acquis
communautaire and supranational integration mechanisms are warranted.”66
Ultimately, the sanctions policy has come to reside within the realm of the
CFSP. The EU Constitutional Treaties grant the European Council the power
to make decisions and enact laws to impose sanctions under the CFSP.67
Article 215 TFEU governs the EU’s sanctions regime.68 Article 215(1) TFEU
sets out the process by which the EU can impose sanctions on a third country,
while Article 215(2) TFEU governs the adoption of restrictive measures
against natural or legal persons or non-state entities.69 Article 215 TFEU

60

Id. See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 180–217.
Sieberson, supra note 35, at 978.
62 The Union can also sanction one of its own Member States, which is not the subject of the discussion
here. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 16.
63 EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 502.
64 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 24(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13
[hereinafter TEU].
65 EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 439.
66 Id. at 502. Acquis communautaire refers to all EU law that has been developed since 1958 until the
present. VAUGHNE MILLER, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, THE EU’S ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 2 (Apr. 26,
2011). “The Court of Justice has ruled that the EU acquis takes precedence over national law if there is a
conflict, and that the acquis may have direct effect in the Member States.” Id.
67 Id.
68 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215.
69 Id.
61
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provides, in relevant part, that where a CFSP decision “provides for the
interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial
relations with one or more third countries” the Council will adopt “the
necessary measures.”70 The term “economic and financial relations” is broad,
encompassing any trade or investment, the transfer of certain or any financial
assets or the freezing of the assets of the target state, and transport sanctions,
which can include flight bans.71 Thus, the European Council comes to a CFSP
decision, which expresses the will of the Union authorizing a regulation or
legislative measure imposing sanctions on third countries.72 The procedure
governing the decision-making authorized by Article 215 will be explored in
greater detail in Part III, infra.
III. DECISION-MAKING AND LEGISLATION UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME
Part III.A will first explore the balance of power in CFSP decision-making.
Part III.B will then set up the various voting and decision-making procedures
employed by EU institutions under the CFSP, with particular focus on the
balance of power within the European Council between individual Member
States. Part III.C and Part III.D will present the arguments for and against the
voting methods employed at the different stages of CFSP and the sanctions
regime, respectively.
A. Balance of Power in CFSP Decision-making: The European Council and
the High Representative
The Treaty of Lisbon made three important institutional changes to the
decision-making make-up of the European Council. It introduced 1) a
permanent Presidency for the European Council, 2) the High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 3) the European External Action
Service.73 Thus, the European Council is now composed of the heads of state
or government of each EU Member State, the President of the European
Commission, and the High Representative.74 For the purposes of this
70

Id.
PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 504 (Sam Parsons & Ben-Jacob CouchDiewitz eds., Hart Publishing 2d ed. 2015).
72 Id. at 505.
73 Skander Nasra, EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon: What Role for Small State Diplomacy?, EINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/14/eu-foreign-policy-after-lisbonwhat-role-for-small-state-diplomacy/.
74 European Council, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.
htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
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discussion, it is important to note that TEU requires that the European Council
makes any CFSP decision “acting unanimously.”75 Historically, the European
Council was an “intergovernmental” EU institution.76 The heads of
government met largely informally in the first years of the Union,77 and the
meetings were subsequently institutionalized first in the Single European Act
and then in the TEU.78 There is a two-part rationale behind institutionalizing
the European Council: 1) when Member State disagreement over a particular
issue was severe, resolution was possible only when the heads of government
intervened; and 2) there was a growing need for “a focus of authority at the
highest political level” and for EU “response to broader world problems [to] be
properly focused.”79
The European Council therefore determines the EU’s CFSP and is the most
important EU institution—symbolically and practically—for EU foreign
relations.80 The European Council therefore has a prominent role in setting the
CFSP.81 Over time, the European Council’s “policy decisions have
significantly furthered the progress of European integration, rather than acting
as a brake on such integration.”82 Because the European Council is responsible
for making the initial decision to impose or renew sanctions on a third country,
its importance in this field is central to this discussion. Moreover, the dynamic
between the heads of government of smaller and larger Member States within
the European Council plays a vital role in how decisions like these are made.83
Though the role of individual Member States will be discussed in greater detail
below, the perceived legitimacy of the European Council depends on to what
extent European citizens see the will of their elected governments expressed in
European Council decisions.
75

TEU, supra note 64, art. 24.
Roger J. Goebel, The European Council After the Treaty of Lisbon, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1251, 1255
(2011) [hereinafter Goebel, The European Council After the Treaty of Lisbon].
77 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 47.
78 Id. at 49.
79 Id. at 48.
80 Eckes, supra note 32, at 907. Eckes provides further detail on the role of the European Council, which
“authorizes the opening of negotiations, adopts negotiating directives, authorizes the signing of, and concludes,
international agreements—acting in principle by the consensus of a qualified majority (subject to exceptions).”
Id.
81 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 47.
82 Goebel, The European Council After the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 76.
83 See Federico Fabbrini, Austerity, the European Council, and the Institutional Future of the European
Union: A Proposal to Strengthen the Presidency of the European Council, 22 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 269, 272 (2015); See generally MICHAEL KEATING, ET AL., ECON. & SOC. RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF
SMALL STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: LESSONS FOR SCOTLAND (2014).
76
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The European Union and Member States share the power to take legislative
action.84 The EU can have either exclusive competence, shared competence, or
competence only to take supporting, coordinating, or supplementary action.85
Article 3 of the TFEU defines when the EU has exclusive competence to
legislate in a specific area.86 The EU has exclusive competence, for example,
in the monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the Euro,87
and also has exclusive competence: “for the conclusion of an international
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union
or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so
far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.”88 Article 24
TFEU governs the EU’s competence to carry out the CFSP, but does not
specify the scope or nature of the Union’s competence.89 The scope of EU
competence to set CFSP is thus distinct from other competences and has
developed through case law and the promulgation of rules by the EU.90
Indeed, Article 2(4) TEU represented a “broadening of the Union’s foreign
policy competences both in its objectives (which explicitly include defense)
and in the means used to attain such goals (through the creation of the High
Representative).”91 Now, the EU implements its foreign policy by making a
series of decisions.92 The European Council decides on the strategic objectives
and interests of the EU.93 These objectives are then released via EU
positions.94 The ultimate manifestation of EU CFSP is the implementation of
these objectives through EU External Action or operations.95
The High Representative of Foreign Affairs exercises significant influence
specifically in the sanctions regime and in CFSP at large. The dual nature of

84 See Division of Competences Within the European Union, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:ai0020 (last updated Jan. 26, 2016) (“Competences not conferred upon the EU
in the Treaties remain with the EU countries. The Treaty of Lisbon clarifies the division of competences
between the EU and EU countries.”).
85 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 73.
86 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 3.
87 Id. art. 3(1)(c).
88 Id. art. 3(2).
89 KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 417.
90 Id. at 422.
91 Eric Engle & Tetiana Danyliuk, Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Facing Crises in
Ukraine and Syria, 25 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 148, 153 (2015).
92 Id. at 154.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 154–55.
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the High Representative’s position reflects two primary objectives.96 The first
objective of the High Representative is to put a face on the EU’s External
Action policy in an effort to “rais[e] its profile.”97 The second objective is to
promote coherence in external policy,98 and to “encourage vertical cohesion.”99
The result has been the creation of an “exceedingly powerful” office of the
High Representative.100 The post became powerful enough to merit the
comment that “individual Member States will find it very difficult to resist the
pressure” of the policy of the High Representative.101 The European External
Action Service, the bureaucratic office that provides support to the High
Representative, is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring
EU sanctions.102 This consolidated the sanctioning regime, but (arguably) has
not been as effective in unifying Member State action.103
B. Decision-making Procedures Under CFSP
The EU makes decisions under the CFSP using a combination of
unanimous voting and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (also referred to as
double majority voting). The Council of the European Union makes decisions
about CFSP unanimously, while measures implementing those decisions are
more often made using QMV.104 A summary of Professor Sieberson’s analysis
on the subject of voting in the EU provides useful context for this section.105
Some scholars advocate for the use of unanimous voting because it supports
the concept that the EU is an intergovernmental organization, as unanimity
preserves the national sovereignty of each Member State within the greater
organization.106 QMV, on the other hand, supports the idea that the EU is an
independent and powerful supranational government, and each Member State
stands behind the decisions made by that government, sometimes at the
expense of their national interest.107 Consistent with its goals of coherence,

96

KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 428.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Marise Cremona, Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law, in EUROPEAN FOREIGN
POLICY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 57 (Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011).
100 KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 430.
101 Id.
102 Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1029.
103 See id. n.119.
104 TEU, supra note 64, art. 31.
105 See generally Sieberson, supra note 35.
106 Id. at 923.
107 Id.
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consistency, and efficiency, the Treaty of Lisbon provided new circumstances
under which the European Council would be able to make a decision using
QMV.108
Historically, unanimous voting was associated with inaction, because one
Member State could exercise a veto and kill any action the EU wanted to
take.109 Proponents of QMV therefore advocated to expand the use of QMV in
certain circumstances because it would make EU lawmaking more efficient.110
The logical counter to that argument, often made by QMV skeptics, was that
increased use of QMV to make decisions “threatens the Member State
sovereignty that unanimous voting would protect.”111 As a result, the EU
retained the unanimity requirements for CFSP measures.112
The Treaty of Lisbon retained the use of QMV, however, in two
circumstances. First, when the European Council has already reached a
unanimous decision relating to the EU’s “strategic interests and objectives,”
the Council may use QMV to make a decision based on that unanimous
decision.113 Second, when the European Council specifically requests that a
Union action be defined, QMV may be used to define that action.114
Importantly, there is a safeguard built into Article 31(2) TEU, which allows a
Member State to invoke national policy and refer a decision to a unanimous
vote by the European Council.115 Article 31(2) provides:
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons
of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to
be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High
Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State
involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not
succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that
the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by
unanimity.116

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 922.
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 131.
Sieberson, supra note 35, at 922.
Id.
Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1031.
Sieberson, supra note 35, at 952.
Id.
TEU, supra note 64, art. 31(2).
Id.

PAPADOPOLOUS GALLEYPROOFS

570

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/16/2017 12:24 PM

[Vol. 31

A Member State also has the option to abstain from a Council vote and declare
that it will not be bound by the Council’s decision.117
C. Decision-making Under the Sanctions Regime
Together, Article 24 TEU and Article 215 TFEU provide the legal and
procedural framework governing the EU sanctioning regime. The TFEU
endows the EU with the power to impose sanctions on states, individuals, and
legal persons.118 Article 215 TFEU governs the procedure whereby the EU can
impose sanctions on states, and also gives the EU the express competence to
impose sanctions.119 Article 215 TFEU defines the scope of sanctions as
affecting “economic and financial relations” between the EU and “one or more
third countries.”120 As mentioned in Part II.B., supra, “Economic and financial
relations” covers trade, investment, transfer of certain or any financial assets or
the freezing of the assets of a target state, and transport sanctions,121 as well as
travel bans.122
In practice, restrictive measures are imposed via a two-step procedure
governed by Article 215 TFEU.123 First, the European Council adopts a CFSP
Decision in which it expresses its wish to interrupt or reduce relations with a
third country in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU (or Article 24
TEU).124 Article 24 TEU specifies that the EU’s CFSP “shall be defined and
implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously,
except where the Treaties provide otherwise.”125 The second step involves the
Council adopting the necessary measures to put that policy into force.126 In this
step, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy together with the Commission draft a joint proposal to implement those
measures.127 The Council then votes by QMV on whether to adopt that joint
proposal.128

117
118
119
120
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122
123
124
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128

Id. art. 31(1).
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 495.
Id.
TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215.
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 504.
Kreutz, supra note 48, at 7.
TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215.
Id. art. 215(1).
TEU, supra note 64, art. 24.
TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215(2).
Id. art. 215(1).
Id. art. 231.
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After the European Council unanimously decides to impose sanctions and
the regulations implementing those sanctions are agreed upon, the regulations
“automatically override all inconsistent national law” of EU Member States.129
The relevant national authorities of each Member State then decide which
activities fall within the scope of the Council regulations.130 The Council
Guidelines on Restrictive Measures specify that “where precision is needed to
ensure that all measures are implemented in time, the CFSP instrument should
indicate expressly how each measure or part of measure will be
implemented.”131
D. Room for a Role for the European Parliament?
This Comment primarily addresses the complaints that EU decisionmaking undermines Member State policy at the head-of-state level; the
European Parliament (EP), however, as a body representing the citizens of the
European Union, has gained a more prominent role in CFSP that is worth
mentioning.132 If the Member States are represented nationally in the European
Council by the heads of state, the citizens of EU Member States directly elect
Members of the EP (MEPs), who directly represent EU citizens in the EP.133
Though voting statistics suggest that actual representation in practice is
questionable at best,134 the EP has the ever-growing potential to offer another
check on the expansive authority of the EU Sanctions regime, and on decisionmaking in other areas where Member State competence has been reduced.
The EP does not have the right to be consulted or give its consent when an
international agreement relates “exclusively to the CFSP.”135 Under Article
218(6) TFEU, which governs the conclusion of international agreements, the
Council shall consult with and receive the consent of the EP when concluding
agreements “covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure
applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European
Parliament is required.”136 The EP therefore does not have a formal role when
129

EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 504.
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 505.
131 2012 Council Guidelines on Restrictive Measures, supra note 47, ¶ 49.
132 See TFEU, supra note 46, art. 10(1)(2); see also Eckes, supra note 32, at 919.
133 Eckes, supra note 32, at 918.
134 Id. Election turnout for MEP elections has been increasingly low since its inception. Id. In her article,
Cristina Eckes argues that citizens have an outlet to “feel better represented through the EP than through their
national parliaments” in external relations. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original).
135 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 218(6).
136 Id. art. 218(6)(a)(v).
130
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the European Union adopts sanctions against third countries.137 The EP only
has the right to be informed of the decision.138
Recently, however, the EP has gained prominence in foreign policy
decision-making following the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, and on its
own accord in the rise of its parliamentary diplomacy.139 Both the Lisbon
Treaty and the Maastricht Treaty now require that the EP consent before
certain international agreements can be concluded.140 Article 218 TFEU also
requires that the EP maintain a prominent role during negotiations for
international agreements.141 However, granting the EP this prominent role has
allowed it to reject two important agreements.142 While granting the EP this
power might essentially suggest CFSP agreements are now more difficult to
make, leading to more inefficiency, some scholars suggest that this change will
ultimately be beneficial as it “give[s] EU citizens a voice that . . . draws on a
source of democratic legitimation that is independent and separate from the EU
member states.”143
If individual citizens feel sufficiently represented in the EP at the
supranational level, they may be less likely to view the EU as an institution
that undermines Member State sovereignty. Granted, allotting power to the EP
may not directly quell the discontent among Member State leaders. Although
these elected leaders set their own state’s foreign policy, they often complain
when those policies are undermined by EU decisions.144 Yet, when the time
comes for a referendum, more representation (or at least the illusion of more
representation) in the EP may help the EU with the problem of growing
Euroscepticism across the continent.

137

GISELA GRIEGER, LIBRARY BRIEFING: LIBRARY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SANCTIONS AS AN EU
2 (2013).

FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT
138 Id.

139 Eckes, supra note 32, at 907; see Daniel Fiott, The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament’s
Parliamentary Groups, SWEDISH INST. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (Mar. 2015), http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/
files/2015_3epa%20eng%20A4%20korr3.pdf.
140 Eckes, supra note 32, at 908.
141 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 218.
142 Eckes, supra note 32, at 909.
143 See id. at 906, 915 (arguing that the EP’s new role can serve to strengthen its link to EU citizens and,
by extension, promote a feeling of “Europeanness” amongst EU citizens).
144 See Johnson, supra note 2.
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E. Jurisdiction of the ECJ in the Sanctions Regime
The ECJ has general jurisdiction to review all matters of EU law and it
even has the authority to review actions taken by EU institutions.145 Under
Article 275 TFEU, however, the ECJ is generally excluded from reviewing
decisions adopted by the Council under CFSP.146 The treaty sources, therefore,
do not allow the ECJ to review a CFSP decision by EU institutions, which
includes the decision to impose sanctions on third countries. However, the
sanctions regime consists of a two-step process, only the first of which
involves a CFSP decision.147 At the second step, where the Council “adopts the
necessary measures,” an EU institution acts in its legislative capacity, as in the
Rosneft case (discussed below) where the Council issued a regulation
implementing sanctions against Russia.148 There, the regulation was not a
CFSP measure.149 The regulations adopted to implement the sanctions decision
are binding in their entirety on natural or legal persons and directly applicable
to EU Member States.150
Rosneft, a partially state-owned Russian oil company, brought suit against
the UK and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority challenging the legality of
the EU’s sanctions against Russia.151 The UK High Court of Justice referred a
series of preliminary questions to the ECJ on this case.152 One of the key
questions in the High Court’s application to the ECJ in Rosneft is whether the
ECJ has jurisdiction to hear the case.153 Technically, all national courts of the
Member States are EU courts, and those courts can refer a question to the ECJ,
through a reference for a preliminary ruling.154 In a report on the arguments by
Rosneft and the UK before the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of
England and Wales, the High Court justified its ability to refer the Rosneft case
145

TEU, supra note 64, art. 19(3)(b).
TFEU, supra note 46, art. 275. Note, however, that the CJEU does have jurisdiction to review the
legality of decisions by the Council to impose targeted sanctions on natural or legal persons. Id.
147 KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 495.
148 See supra Part II.D.
149 Stian Oby Johansen, EU Sanctions Against Non-EU Countries: The CJEU Will Soon Address Some
Key Legal Issues, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 26, 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/02/eusanctions-against-non-eu-countries.html.
150 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215; TEU, supra note 64, art. 28(2). See Johansen, supra note 149.
151 OJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. HM Treasury & Others [2015] EWHC (Admin) 248 [5] (Eng.).
152 Case C-72/15, OJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. HM Treasury & Others, Reference for Preliminary
Ruling from High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court) (Feb. 18,
2015).
153 Id.
154 Reference for a Preliminary Ruling, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
URISERV%3Al14552 (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).
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to the ECJ on two provisions, albeit from different legal regimes.155 The first
was Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which enshrines
the principle that any measure by the executive can and should be reviewed by
a court.156 Any exception to this fundamental right should be strictly
construed.157 The High Court then referred to a second provision, Article 19(1)
TEU, which states that the ECJ shall ensure that the interpretation and
application of treaty law is observed.158 On these bases, the ECJ may agree that
it has jurisdiction to review the decision of the EU to impose sanctions on
Rosneft.
IV. MEMBER STATE AUTONOMY UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME
A. Member States’ Role at the CFSP Decision Stage
EU heads of state representing individual Member States convene in the
European Council and negotiate to come to the decision to impose sanctions.159
Under Article 24(1) TEU, a CFSP decision made by the European Council
cannot be legislative in nature.160 The CFSP decision is “defined and
implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously,
except where the Treaties provide otherwise.”161 The European Council’s
CFSP decision puts forward a general political concept explaining why the EU
is choosing to disrupt trade relations with a third country.162 Legislation
follows in the form of regulations, which are decided by the European Council
using QMV.163 The regulations provide details for how the sanctions should be
implemented by Member States.
At the first step in the sanctions process, the treaties require that the heads
of state in the European Council vote unanimously to impose sanctions.164
Historically, when a group of states enter into a treaty, they each expect to
155 Stephen Vousden, Case C-72/15, Rosneft – Challenging the EU’s Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia,
EU L. RADAR (Mar. 22, 2015), http://eulawradar.com/case-c-7215-rosneft-challenging-the-eus-sectoralsanctions-against-russia/.
156 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
157 Id.
158 TEU, supra note 64, art. 19(1).
159 See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 17, at 47.
160 Id. art. 24(1).
161 Id.
162 TFEU, supra note 46, art. 215.
163 Id.
164 TEU, supra note 64, art. 24.
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engage in unanimous decision-making under that agreement, i.e., they retain
the power to exercise a veto when the group makes decisions.165 In traditional
treaty-type diplomatic conferences, two basic principles typically apply to
voting: 1) every state has an equal say and 2) no state can be bound without its
consent.166 These two concepts are referred to as the doctrine of sovereign
equality of states and the rule of unanimity, respectively.167 The principle of
autonomy over foreign policy decision-making, however, has ensured that any
votes on foreign policy are unanimous.
The veto also represents political power for the heads of state. After
blocking a vote to renew sanctions on Russia, for example, heads of state who
exercised their veto can demonstrate that they respected the will of the
people.168 Indeed, Member States in the EU can and have exercised their veto
power either to block a decision or to dilute the strength of the legislation in
question.169 As discussed earlier in this Comment, however, achieving a
unanimous decision is inefficient and time-consuming, and it can lead to
stalemates.170 However, the unanimous vote preserves national sovereignty by
promoting this intergovernmental method of decision-making.
B. Independent Action Left to Member States to Impose Regulations
The sanctions regime allows the Member States to retain a degree of
autonomy in executing a decision to impose sanctions and giving effect to a
regulation.171 The regulation is the second step of the two-step process by
which the EU imposes sanctions,172 and it is not only binding on individuals
subject to the EU’s jurisdiction, but also imposes an obligation on Member
States to enforce the regulations.173 The Member States are expected to
“provide for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties, and they are
generally required to take all measures necessary to make sanctions
effective.”174

165
166
167
168
169
170
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Sieberson, supra note 35, at 932.
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See Mills, supra note 16.
Sieberson, supra note 35, at 932.
See supra Part II.B, Part III.C.
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 505.
Id. at 495.
Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 50, at 1038.
EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 541.
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Individual Member States, in theory, are not required to implement the
sanctions. Under Article 31(1) TEU, a Member State may abstain from a
unanimous European Council vote and declare that it will not be bound by the
decision.175 Article 31(1) goes on, however, to prevent any Member State from
taking “any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that
decision.”176 According to this provision, a European Council member’s
abstention does not prevent the European Council decision from coming into
effect.177 The national authorities of Member States are then left with two
tasks: 1) authorize activities which fall within the scope of the regulations and
2) define any deviations that can be made from those regulations, under
specific circumstances.178 The power to abstain from a unanimous European
Council vote, therefore, in practice does not give Member States any more
autonomy. The Member States must still adhere to any prohibitions
enumerated in the regulations preventing trade or interaction between EU
citizens and the sanctioned country. Even the specific circumstances whereby a
Member State can deviate are also limited.
The question of whether Member States can deviate from Community Law
and impose their own sanctions came before the ECJ in Commission v. Greece.
While the court was not obliged to deliver a judgment on the case, Advocate
General Jacobs delivered an opinion.179 Incidentally, this opinion is the only
authority (albeit non-binding) on whether Article 347 applies.180 Article 347
TFEU allows a Member State to deviate from Community law as long as it
adheres to three conditions: 1) the Member State may deviate only in such
circumstances that are laid down in Article 347; 2) the Member State that
needs to act should consult with other Member States in order to adopt a
common approach aiming to protect the internal market; and 3) the
Commission is responsible for examining how national measures deviating
from EU law can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties (from
Article 348 TFEU).181 The Advocate General’s opinion stressed that while
Member States have a better awareness of their own needs in terms of foreign
and security policy, relying on Article 347 TFEU to impose economic
sanctions against third countries would undermine the system set up under
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

TEU, supra note 64, art. 31(1).
Id.
Goebel, The European Council After the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 76, at 1258.
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 505.
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-120/94, Comm’n v. Greece, 1996 E.C.R. I-1513.
Id.
KOUTRAKOS, supra note 71, at 507–08.
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Article 215 TFEU.182 While the facts of this case leading to the opinion
involved a Member State deviating by imposing its own embargo on a third
country, the opinion reflected another limitation on potential independent
actions taken by Member States: “there are . . . no judicial or manageable
standards by which to judge these issues . . . the court would be in a judicial
no-man’s land.”183
A 1997 ECJ case, however, showed that there are limits to the independent
actions Member States can take to make sanctions effective.184 In Centro-Com
v. HM Treasury, the ECJ held that Member States were not entitled to adopt
measures that interfered with the operation of Community regulations
imposing restrictive measures on Serbia and Montenegro.185 Centro-Com
concerned sanctions adopted by the EU on Serbia and Montenegro pursuant to
a decree by the U.N. Security Council.186 The regulation implementing the
sanction provided an exception for medical supplies and food.187 Centro-Com,
an Italian company, exported medical supplies to Montenegro and
subsequently requested payment for those sales through a bank account held by
Yugoslavia with a bank in London.188 The UK, however, refused payment due
to a national policy permitting payment only for exports from the UK, a policy
designed to prevent violation of the sanctions.189 The UK argued that it had
undertaken these measures under its national competence in the field of foreign
and security law to implement UN sanctions.190 The question came before the
Court to consider whether the United Kingdom’s deviation from Sanctions
Regulation was compatible with the CCP generally and the sanctions rules in
this specific case.191
In its judgment, the ECJ clarified the difference between measures of
foreign and security policy and those of the CCP.192 Additionally, the ECJ
specified that although it accepted the United Kingdom’s argument that
182
183
184
185

Case C-120/94, Comm’n v. Greece, 1996 E.C.R. I-1513.
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EECKHOUT, supra note 39, at 541.
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Member States do retain their competence in the field of foreign and security
policy, they are nonetheless obligated to exercise their power in a manner
consistent with EU law.193 The reasoning here was not only consistent with the
Court’s case law on the supremacy of EU law, but also reinforced the concept
that a CFSP decision (or, at the time, a foreign policy decision) was made by
the Member States acting unanimously and is a manifestation of the political
will of each Member State.
Politically, the European Union needs to speak with a unified voice while
simultaneously honoring the national interests of each Member State,
especially when taking measures as strong as imposing sanctions on a non-EU
state. A Gallup poll conducted from May–June 2015 revealed that forty-five
percent of Greeks opposed EU sanctions on Russia, primarily because of the
negative effects the sanctions were having on the Greek economy.194 Since
April 2015, other EU Member States have demonstrated their opposition to
sanctions that have delivered a debilitating blow not only to Russia’s economy,
but also to the economies of Member States themselves.195 Despite this
opposition, the European Council renewed EU sanctions on Russia first in June
2015 and again in December of that year.196
Each of these legal provisions and cases highlight an important prevailing
principle: because the EU must speak with a unified voice, any independent
Member State action reflecting a disagreement or opposition to EU policies
undermines the strength and legitimacy of that voice. If we consider the
hypothetical situation where, for example, a Member State like Greece refuses
to honor the trade embargoes or food bans from Russia, the Commission could
bring a case before the ECJ requesting Greek compliance with the sanctioning
policy.197 The ECJ would likely ask whether Greece went through the
necessary procedural steps to avoid implementing the sanctions policy. The

193
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Phillip Chrysopoulos, Nearly Half of Greeks Oppose EU Sanctions Against Russia, GREEK REP.
(Aug. 26,
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195 Some European Countries Want Russian Sanctions Lifted, McCain Says US to Decide, RT (Feb. 3,
2016, 7:59 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/331111-sanctions-eu-mccain-usa/.
196 James Kanter, EU to Extend Sanctions Against Russia, But Divisions Show, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/world/europe/eu-to-extend-sanctions-against-russia-but-divisionsshow.html?_r=0.
197 For background on enforcement actions against Member States, see CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note
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next section will assess whether a Member State could, in practice, abstain
from a vote using Article 31(1) or invoke national policy under Article 23.
C. Member State Opposition in Practice
The EU may impose two different kinds of sanctions: those that implement
UN sanctions or autonomous EU sanctions.198 At the time of this writing, there
are no UN sanctions in place against Russia.199 The EU sanctions against
Russia are thus autonomous EU sanctions adopted pursuant to Article 215
TFEU. On March 3, 2014, the Council of the European Union’s Foreign
Affairs Council condemned “the clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces as well as
the authorization given by the Federation Council of Russia on 1 March for the
use of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine.”200 The European
Council then held an extraordinary meeting on March 6, 2014 where they
agreed to prepare individual restrictive measures which involved freezing
assets and imposing travel bans.201
On March 17, 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the
European Union adopted restrictive measures against twenty-one Russian
officials, as well as the persons and entities associated with them, including
travel bans and asset freezes which came into force immediately.202 The EU
also limited access to its “primary and secondary markets of [five] major
Russian majority state-owned financial institutions and their majority-owned
subsidiaries, as well as three major Russian energy and three defense
companies.”203 In response, the Russian Federation imposed a ban on food
imports from the EU, the United States, Australia, Canada, and Norway.204
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Moscow then extended that ban by presidential decree until August 2016.205
The EU continued to increase the pressure on Russia by expanding the
restrictive measures and adding individuals to the list.206 At the time of this
writing, “152 persons and 37 entities are subject to an asset freeze and a travel
ban.”207
On December 18, 2015, the EU moved to extend Russian sanctions for
another six months, while frustration grew over Germany’s plans to move
forward with a gas pipeline project called Nord Stream 2.208 Italy, generally
classified as a large Member State (and therefore one wielding more political
power),209 was able to cause a one-month delay in the decision to renew the
sanctions earlier in the month by exercising its veto.210 Italy had a stake in
another gas pipeline project called South Stream, which was cancelled earlier
in the year, and the Italian farming and fishing industries suffered economic
blows due to the sanctions.211
Despite Greece’s ever-warming relations with Russia,212 Hungarian and
Slovakian opposition to further sanctions, and Italian frustration with the recent
Russian gas pipeline decisions,213 the European Council has continued to
unanimously approve CFSP decisions, renewing EU sanctions on Russia. Italy,
as a large Member State, could exercise some power, but there was no
evidence of such use of power by any of the smaller states. The hypothetical
question that follows and that this Comment has sought to address is what legal
recourse could an individual Member State have when it opposes a CFSP
decision?
A Member State could rely on Article 31 to abstain from voting on a CFSP
decision in the European Council. Article 31 only invalidates a unanimous vote
205
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in the event that one-third or more of the Member States abstain from a CFSP
decision,214 so the risk of the stronger Member States pressuring those who are
abstaining from the vote to join the majority may be lessened. However, any
abstention would not serve the principles of coherence and efficiency. The EU
would not speak with a unified voice through the sanctions, and it would
appear weak in its decision. Any political pressure from the other members of
the European Council would probably have the same effect on a possible
abstention as it would on a veto.
At the second step of the process, when the Council votes by QMV on
legislation to impose sanctions, opposing Member States could also invoke
national policy under Article 23(1). This action forces referral of the Council
decision on how to impose regulations to the European Council for a
unanimous vote.215 Because the regulation stage uses QMV, there is a legal
safeguard in the Treaty giving Member States the ability to go through a
second stage of unanimous voting to ensure that CFSP and national
sovereignty principles were upheld.216 However, this process is lengthy and
could also subject foreign ministers to political pressure by other foreign
ministers in the Council. Research has actually revealed that decision-making
by the Council of Ministers is often ambiguous because the Council votes by
consensus and does not publish the opposition to those votes.217 Thus, a
minister is unlikely to invoke Article 23(1) on behalf of his or her Member
State in a proceeding like this one.
An analysis of the relevant treaty provisions reveals that although the
Treaties legally provide safeguards that seemingly preserve national
sovereignty in the realm of CFSP and, by extension, the sanctions regime, they
are ineffectual in practice. Although the movement toward the use of more
QMV in CFSP in the Treaty of Lisbon does not signal that the EU is becoming
more centralized or supranational, it does reflect an overall shift favoring
efficiency and coherence in CFSP decision-making at the expense of the
national interests of individual Member States.
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CONCLUSIONS
This Comment primarily seeks to shed light on the recently criticized
decision-making process in the EU and to argue that though the process is
flawed and in need of amendment, it is not creating a process of “legal
colonisation.”218 The European Council, which in theory espouses these ideals
of hegemony and national sovereignty, and the decision-making mechanisms it
employs, provide an eye-opening case study. When individual citizens of a
Member State see their government taking a strong stance against an EU
policy, which nevertheless is agreed to after a unanimous vote, it is inevitable
that they begin to question the European Council’s legitimacy. Though the
qualms with the decision-making process are only few among many, they are
important and underlie many of the chief complaints with the EU. Member
States and their citizens feel disillusioned with how they are represented in the
EU. There are methods, however, which can boost morale. Votes to leave the
European Union are not the only solution.
The increased involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP decisionmaking and of the ECJ in hearing the cases challenging sanctions can provide a
solution in the future. Both of these EU institutions have not only come to hold
significant power, but provide a forum where both the Member State
representatives as well as EU citizens can challenge supranational decisions.
Though both of these checks can hinder the process of imposing sanctions,
they are vital to restoring the faith of the EU citizenry in the European project.
Should the treaties be revised? The preceding paragraphs indicate that
efforts have been made, legally speaking, to protect the national sovereignty of
Member States in the realm of foreign policy by retaining unanimous voting at
the policy-setting stage and allowing constructive abstentions. There is a
logical inconsistency, however, when the Treaties provide that Member States
can abstain from a vote and therefore not be obligated to enforce a regulation,
but may not take any action that would compromise the overall aim of the
policy. What then would happen if a Member State like Greece, struggling to
rehabilitate its debt-stricken economy, chooses to reinstate trade relations with
Russia? At every stage of the process assessed above, there is either a legal
mechanism or a political force bringing any recalcitrant Member State back in
line with the group. The European Parliament can provide another outlet for
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Member States and their citizens to assert their position and (at the very least)
feel better represented.
MELANIE C. PAPADOPOULOS



Editor-in-Chief, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law
(2017); B.A., cum laude, Tufts University (2012). The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor
Magdalena Tulibacka and Vice Dean Robert B. Ahdieh for their mentorship and thoughtful advice in writing
this Comment. The author is also immensely grateful to the staff of the Emory International Law Review for
their meticulous editing efforts and friendship. Finally, the author would like to thank her family, Rom,
Jeanette, Tony, and Apollo Papadopoulos for their love, patience, and unwavering support.

